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Missing the wood (with no excuses): the Defamation Bill 2012
Alastair Mullis and Andrew Scott argue that the Defamation bill misses the mark
and reeks of a Government unprepared to do the hard-thinking necessary to produce a
media law fit for our contemporary society.
The Def amation Bill is to receive a second reading in the House of  Commons on 12
June. In preparation, Lord McNally has been repeating the mantra that the ref orms will
introduce a better balance between f ree speech and the protection of  reputation in the
law of  libel. The inf erence to be drawn is that the substantive law is currently weighted in f avour of
reputation. Any casual observer of  the ballyhoo and passing f renzy that has characterised discussion of
this issue over the past 24 months would no doubt nod assent.
As we demonstrated in a recent paper (‘The Swing of  the Pendulum’ (2012) NILQ, 63(1), 27-58), however,
this conclusion is simply divorced f rom reality. Every change to the law of  libel in recent decades has
promoted f ree speech. The law is not now particularly at f ault. Very notably, none of  the cause célèbre
cases that are cited as evidence of  the problems with the law – Simon Singh’s case; Hardeep Singh’s
case; Peter Wilmshurst’s case; Henrik Thomsen’s case – culminated in a loss bef ore the courts. Libel
tourism, as a curial phenomenon, has been proven by the Ministry of  Justice’s own research to be all but
a f igment of  the imagination.
The Def amation Bill manif estly misses the mark. The problem with libel has always been and remains the
harm caused by threats and bullying in the shadow of  the law. Such threats rely on the f ear of  the cost
of  embroilment in libel proceedings, not on the expectation that a case would necessarily be lost. The
chilling ef f ect that costs create persists; signal instances can be easily cited. It can bite either bef ore
publication to deter crit icism, or af ter the f act to see def endants with solid cases capitulate.
Importantly, though, this harm bites both ways. Recalcitrant publishers have equally been able to outlast
the average claimant in the battle of  deep pockets through costly legal game-playing and prevarication.
Most potential claimants lack the f inancial wherewithal even to contemplate legal action. As we have
suggested f rom the outset of  the libel ref orm debate, it would be best if  attention was directed towards
ref orming costs, procedures and remedies. One of  us would go f urther, and recommend the introduction
of  ‘anti-SLAPP’ legislation.
Yet, and aside f rom introducing questionable new rules f or Internet publication, Lord McNally’s Bill adopts
two enervating strategies. First, in the early clauses it of f ers what is essentially a restatement of  the
existing law on the ‘seriousness gateway’ (clause 1) and on the main def ences (clauses 2, 3 and 4). This
will have two main ef f ects: to create uncertainty as lawyers take time and money to ask the courts
whether the law remains as it was, and to put paid to the old trope that Parliamentary t ime is precious.
The second strategy pursued in the Bill is the setting out of  arbitrary rules that will prevent people with
perf ectly valid claims f rom seeking redress f or harms to their reputation. Hence we have the single
publication rule (clause 8), the jurisdictional exclusion (clause 9), and the privilege f or scientif ic and
academic publication (clause 5). These proposals f ollow on f rom the travesty of  recent changes to the
lit igation f unding regime that in practice return libel law to being the preserve of  the wealthy.
All of  this would be f ine if  reputation, whether corporate or personal, did not matter. If  the goal is to
apotheosise f ree speech, however, then it would be simpler and more candid f or the Government simply
to repeal the law of  libel. But of  course, as every scholar of  literature, every business person, and at
least those MPs of  the 2009 vintage must understand, reputation is a key component of  each individual’s
public lif e and psychological integrity. Moreover, without it, any business is f inished. Devastating harm
can be exacted bef ore the truth gets its boots on.
The Bill prof f ers precisely the meagre proposals that one would bring f orward af ter having approached
the matter with only one eye open, and having assumed that nothing could be done about the real
problems of  high cost, over-complicated process and inappropriate remedies. In those areas, the Bill
takes only the lowest of  low-hanging f ruit. Remedies are lef t virtually untouched, bar the possibility that
at the very end of  the day a court may order a summary of  its judgment to be published (Clause 12).
There is nothing radical in the Bill that will change signif icantly the way in which complaints proceed.
We have published our views on a better way f orward elsewhere (‘Ref raming libel: taking (all) rights
seriously and where it leads’ (2012) NILQ, 63(1), 5-25). We may not have the right solutions (we suggest
taking much of  the libel process out of  the High Court, jett isoning the complicating ‘single meaning rule’,
emphasising discursive remedies, and changing the rules on costs allocation), and certainly have not
persuaded the Government. Nevertheless, our suggestions do address the central issue of  what libel law
is f or, how it should operate, and how we might sensibly simplif y the existing law and procedure. Other
good proposals are not thin on the ground.
Perhaps most importantly, we must recognise that what most people really want when they are def amed
is a right to set the record straight, or at least to put their side of  the story. A proper system of
discursive remedies has the potential to divert many potential claims f rom the courts. It would see the
truth put into the public domain (corrections), and/or provide f or the other side of  the story to be heard
(rights of  reply). Freedom of  speech should not be conceived of  as a right to def ame others without
consequence. Who would choose to live in a Sinonian land of  plausible liars, and to suf f er the lies they
tell?
In this context, the contrast between the Bill and the prescription f or the f uture mooted last week by Lord
Justice Leveson in conversation with Tony Blair is embarrassingly stark. In the judge’s view, the system
must ingrain f ree speech, but should also include a mechanism that allows members of  the public to
challenge publishing decisions that impinge wrongly on privacy or reputation. It should provide f or speedy
and ef f ective redress with sanctions that work, particularly f or those currently unable to contemplate
lit igation. Well said.
Should not the Government wait on the recommendations to be presented by Leveson in the Autumn? Of
course, but sadly the Bill reeks of  a Government unprepared to do the hard-thinking necessary to
produce a media law f it f or our contemporary society.
Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the British Politics and Policy blog,
nor of the London School of Economics. Please read our comments policy before posting.
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